Daniel Otera
The Boko Haram insurgency, which has dominated the Nigerian security landscape for over a decade, continues to defy all attempts at resolution, despite numerous peace efforts and military interventions. Recent revelations by former President Goodluck Jonathan shed new light on the depth of these efforts, while also exposing the intricate, often opaque factors that sustain the insurgency. Jonathan’s disclosure that Boko Haram once nominated Muhammadu Buhari to lead negotiations with the federal government raises several pertinent questions about the negotiations, tactics, and continued persistence of the conflict.
At the heart of the ongoing insurgency is the challenge of negotiation and dialogue. Jonathan, in a recent public presentation of the book SCARS: Nigeria’s Journey and The Boko Haram Conundrum, authored by General Lucky Irabor, revealed a striking development during his administration’s early attempts to reach a peaceful resolution with Boko Haram. He recalled that the insurgents had nominated former President Muhammadu Buhari to represent them in negotiations with the Nigerian government.
“During one of such processes, the insurgents put forward Buhari to lead their team to negotiate with the government,” Jonathan said. This disclosure opens a window into the nuanced nature of insurgent negotiations, where Boko Haram, despite its violent tendencies, sought a route for dialogue and potential peace. The idea of negotiation with a figure as polarizing as Buhari indicates a strategic calculation from Boko Haram a group known for its deadly attacks on civilians and military personnel alike.
Jonathan’s words reflect more than a historical detail. They highlight the evolving tactics Boko Haram uses to engage with the government, attempting to break down barriers and create divisions among key leadership figures. The question remains: if such negotiations had been pursued, would the trajectory of Nigeria’s battle against Boko Haram have shifted? Would the insurgency have seen an earlier resolution, or was the depth of the group’s ideological commitment such that even dialogues with political leaders would have faltered?
Despite the revelation that negotiations were attempted, the fact remains that Boko Haram’s grip on Northern Nigeria endures. To understand why, we must turn to the data that reveals not only the strategic response of Nigeria’s military but also the underpinnings of Boko Haram’s resilience.
The Boko Haram insurgency has had a devastating impact on both the security landscape and the civilian population in Nigeria. According to data from the Nigerian Army and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Boko Haram has largely maintained its insurgency through asymmetric warfare, including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the strategic manipulation of local populations. This persistent violence has led to substantial loss of life and forced displacement across the affected regions. 36,000 deaths have been attributed to the insurgency, with the majority of casualties being civilians, over 2 million people have been displaced, many living in temporary camps dependent on humanitarian aid for survival.
This scale of displacement, combined with the ongoing security threats posed by Boko Haram, continues to undermine efforts for stability and peace in Northern Nigeria. The long-term consequences of these displacements are not just humanitarian but also socio-economic, affecting livelihoods, education, and access to basic services. The persistence of this crisis underscores the need for a multi-faceted approach that combines military intervention with long-term peace-building strategies, ensuring that affected communities are not only protected but also supported in rebuilding their lives.
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the humanitarian response to this ongoing crisis remains a significant challenge. Thousands of families continue to face extreme hardship as a result of the violence, with the conflict’s devastating toll on the region’s infrastructure and resources making recovery efforts increasingly difficult (OCHA, 2025).
Boko Haram’s insurgency has extended far beyond its original strongholds in the North East of Nigeria, with recent reports indicating significant territorial expansion into parts of the North Central region. This strategic growth is largely attributed to a combination of regional security gaps, local conflicts, and porous borders that have allowed the group to spread its influence despite ongoing counterinsurgency efforts.
According to a 2020 report by ReliefWeb, Boko Haram has gradually shifted its operations from the North East into the North West and parts of the North Central, where it capitalizes on the absence of effective government control in some areas. This geographical extension has been accompanied by a marked increase in insurgent activities, as the group seeks to secure new supply routes and recruit fighters from local communities facing limited state presence.
Further data from ReliefWeb’s 2025 analysis shows that Boko Haram continues to use the instability created by local conflicts to strengthen its hold in these new areas. By leveraging the security vacuums and exploiting ongoing regional instability, the group has been able to expand its operational capacity. This has allowed them to maintain crucial logistical and supply routes, keeping their insurgency well-funded and capable of sustaining operations despite countermeasures from the Nigerian military.
As a result, Boko Haram now controls significant swaths of territory in these regions, including areas where government forces have struggled to maintain a permanent presence. In total, a 2023 report from OCHA estimated that Boko Haram controls up to 30% of the land in both the North East and North Central regions, further exacerbating the already complex security situation.
Boko Haram’s capacity to sustain its insurgency has been significantly bolstered by the acquisition of advanced weaponry, sourced from both regional and international networks. One of the primary sources of these weapons comes from the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Sahel region, exacerbated by the instability in countries like Libya.
According to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), Boko Haram has been able to obtain these weapons through porous borders, making it difficult for Nigerian authorities to effectively curb the insurgency. The 2022 NFIU report highlighted the role of illicit financial flows, including illegal money exchangers and dealers in rough gold, as key financial mechanisms used to fund Boko Haram’s operations. These financial activities often occur in Nigeria’s North West and North Central regions—areas severely affected by banditry and insurgent activity.
Boko Haram’s extensive use of SALW has enabled the group to continue its operations despite significant military efforts from the Nigerian government. These weapons, ranging from assault rifles to explosives and even drones, have largely flowed into Nigeria from neighboring regions in the Sahel, particularly following the instability caused by the fall of Gaddafi in Libya.
In addition, the United Nations has underscored the role of illicit arms trafficking in prolonging insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram operates. A 2021 Security Council report revealed that the subregion is heavily impacted by cross-border smuggling and arms trafficking, which provide insurgent groups like Boko Haram with the tools needed to maintain their operations.
Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, which has implemented several measures to combat arms trafficking and terrorist financing, Boko Haram continues to exploit these vulnerabilities. The NFIU’s report also revealed how the group utilizes various covert methods to fund its insurgency, including through the illegal exchange of currencies and resources such as gold.
To counter these financial networks, Nigerian authorities have ramped up measures to track and disrupt illicit financial flows, including tightening regulations around the trade in natural resources and currency exchange. The hope is that by disrupting the financial infrastructure supporting Boko Haram, the group’s operations can be significantly weakened.
One of the most haunting legacies of Boko Haram’s violence is the abduction of the Chibok girls in April 2014. Jonathan’s comments on this painful chapter in Nigeria’s history, which he described as a “scar that will die with me,” reflect the emotional and psychological toll the incident continues to have on the nation. Of the 276 girls abducted, over 100 are still unaccounted for, and the search continues.
Jonathan noted the difficulty in fully understanding the dynamics behind such events, saying, “If you conduct research and interview many people, you will only get part of the story, but never the full story of Boko Haram.” This sentiment speaks to the deeper, often unseen layers of the insurgency—the recruitment strategies, the manipulation of young minds, and the deeply entrenched beliefs that fuel its continued existence.
While progress has been made in recovering the Chibok girls over 100 have been freed the emotional scars of this tragedy remain. As Jonathan suggested, many of the motivations and internal workings of Boko Haram are still shrouded in mystery, as the leaders of the group remain largely unknown.
Jonathan also pointed to an often-overlooked aspect of the conflict: the external involvement in the insurgency. “Where are these guns and sophisticated weapons coming from? You begin to see that external hands are also involved,” Jonathan remarked. This statement draws attention to the international dimension of the Boko Haram insurgency, one that has been largely underreported.
The persistent ability of Boko Haram to finance its insurgency through such diverse and illicit means demonstrates the group’s resilience and the challenges faced by Nigeria and its allies in disrupting these networks. Despite the complex web of negotiations, external involvement, and sustained military efforts, the Boko Haram insurgency remains deeply entrenched in Nigeria.
As Jonathan suggested, addressing Boko Haram requires more than just military intervention. A combination of “carrots and the stick” may be necessary—a strategy that provides incentives for surrender, alongside pressure for those who choose to continue their insurgency. However, this is easier said than done.
The Nigerian government, in partnership with regional allies, must continue to strengthen intelligence-sharing frameworks and adopt more sophisticated counterinsurgency tactics that address the root causes of insurgency, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to education. Furthermore, efforts to block illicit funding routes and arms supplies must be ramped up, with a focus on international cooperation.
Ultimately, a comprehensive strategy combining military efforts, socio-economic support, and regional cooperation will be necessary to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency and ensure lasting peace in Nigeria.