A five year sentence handed to former Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno over a bribery scheme linked to the country’s largest hydroelectric plant has brought renewed scrutiny to a project that was once presented as a cornerstone of Ecuador’s energy independence, but has also faced technical problems, contractual disputes and years of unresolved questions over public money.
Ecuador’s National Court of Justice convicted Moreno on Friday, August 28, 2026, alongside 19 other people in the Sinohydro case involving Coca Codo Sinclair. Prosecutors said about $76.1 million in bribes were paid in connection with the project, representing roughly 4 per cent of its contracted value.
Moreno, 73, served as Ecuador’s vice president from 2007 to 2013 and president from 2017 to 2021. He has denied receiving money from Sinohydro and said he neither signed nor supervised the contracts at the centre of the case. Reuters reported that he plans to appeal the conviction.
The conviction is significant beyond the former president himself because Coca Codo Sinclair is not an ordinary infrastructure project. It is a 1,500 megawatt facility that remains one of the most important components of Ecuador’s electricity system.
Coca Codo Sinclair was conceived as a major shift in Ecuador’s energy system. The project was designed to exploit the Coca River and generate electricity from a 620 metre natural elevation drop between the water intake and powerhouse.
The Ecuadorian government initially contracted the project to China’s Sinohydro for about $1.979 billion. According to the state electricity company, CELEC EP, the eventual project cost reached about $2.245 billion after including civil works, electromechanical equipment, supervision, administration and other costs.
The project has eight Pelton turbines, each rated at 187.5 MW, giving it its total installed capacity of 1,500 MW. It entered operation in 2016.
Its importance to Ecuador’s electricity supply can be seen in actual generation data. The country’s electricity operator, CENACE, reported that Coca Codo Sinclair generated 7,284.88 GWh in 2024. That represented 31.73 per cent of the country’s total hydroelectric generation that year.
That makes the corruption case particularly consequential. The allegations concern a project involving billions of dollars in public infrastructure and an asset that supplies a substantial share of Ecuador’s electricity.
Ecuador’s Public Prosecutor’s Office said its investigation uncovered an alleged network operating between 2009 and 2018 through payments made by Sinohydro and channelled through third parties.
According to prosecutors, approximately $76.1 million was allegedly moved through companies including Recorsa, with payments disguised as consultancy and representation services. Financial investigators traced transfers, cheques and other transactions during the investigation.
The investigation eventually led to charges against 37 people in 2023. By the trial stage, 21 people were being prosecuted. Prosecutors presented 29 witnesses, 19 experts and 90 documentary exhibits during 31 days of hearings, according to the Ecuadorian prosecution service.
The court ultimately convicted 20 defendants.
Moreno and four others were classified as direct perpetrators and received five year sentences. Two others received three years, while 12 people convicted as accomplices received two years and six months.
The case therefore involved more than the former president. It also covered business figures, Chinese nationals and members of Moreno’s wider family network.
The Project Had Problems Beyond Corruption Allegations
The criminal case is only one part of Coca Codo Sinclair’s complicated history.
The power plant has faced persistent technical concerns since becoming operational. Ecuador’s National Assembly reported in 2021 that technical assessments had identified 39 outstanding repairs, including problems described as originating from the construction rather than routine maintenance. Officials also said the original contract had risen above $2.4 billion after amendments, price adjustments and other costs.
The Coca River has also caused erosion concerns around the infrastructure. The US Energy Information Administration noted that the plant had required repairs associated with erosion since its commissioning and had experienced operational complications affecting its ability to run at full capacity.
Yet the facility remains indispensable.
In September 2025, CELEC announced that Coca Codo Sinclair had returned to its full 1,500 MW capacity following maintenance on its first phase. The work included repairs to turbines, valves, transformers and other equipment.
More importantly, the long running contractual dispute has now entered another phase.
In April 2026, CELEC and Sinohydro signed the definitive acceptance document for the 1,500 MW project, bringing a contractual process that had remained unresolved for more than a decade to a formal conclusion. Ecuador’s National Assembly subsequently opened a fiscalisation process concerning the arbitration award and the settlement between CELEC and Sinohydro.
That development gives Moreno’s conviction a fresh relevance. The criminal proceedings and the infrastructure dispute are separate matters, but both concern the same project and its long financial and contractual history.
The Coca Codo Sinclair case illustrates the difficulty of assessing large infrastructure projects solely by their physical output.
On one measure, the project has delivered significant electricity. With 1,500 MW of installed capacity and more than 7,284 GWh generated in 2024, it remains a critical component of Ecuador’s power system.
On another measure, however, the project has generated years of disputes over construction quality, repairs, contractual obligations and alleged corruption.
The latest court ruling does not establish that every problem associated with the plant resulted from corruption. Nor does the plant’s importance erase the allegations and findings surrounding its procurement.
What the judgment establishes, subject to appeal and any further judicial proceedings, is that Ecuador’s National Court of Justice found 20 defendants criminally responsible for bribery connected with the project.
Moreno’s appeal means the legal process is not necessarily at its final stage.
For countries investing billions in power, roads, railways and other strategic infrastructure, the broader lesson is the importance of procurement transparency, financial traceability, independent technical supervision and accountability after contracts are awarded.
Coca Codo Sinclair was built to reduce Ecuador’s dependence on thermal generation and imported electricity. A decade later, it remains vital to the country’s power supply. But the conviction surrounding its construction and financing shows that the success of major infrastructure cannot be measured only by how much electricity it generates.